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A B S T R A C T
Trait impressions from faces influence many consequential decisions even in situations in which decisions should
not be based on a person's appearance. Here, we test (a) whether people rely on trait impressions when making
legal sentencing decisions and (b) whether two types of interventions—educating decision-makers and changing
the accessibility of facial information—reduce the influence of facial stereotypes. We first introduced a novel
legal decision-making paradigm. Results of a pretest (n = 320) showed that defendants with an untrustworthy
(vs. trustworthy) facial appearance were found guilty more often. We then tested the effectiveness of different
interventions in reducing the influence of facial stereotypes. Educating participants about the biasing effects of
facial stereotypes reduced explicit beliefs that personality is reflected in facial features, but did not reduce the
influence of facial stereotypes on verdicts (Study 1, n = 979). In Study 2 (n = 975), we presented information
sequentially to disrupt the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions. Participants indicated an initial verdict
based on case-relevant information and a final verdict based on all information (including facial photographs).
The majority of initial sentences were not revised and therefore unbiased. However, most revised sentences were
in line with facial stereotypes (e.g., a guilty verdict for an untrustworthy-looking defendant). On average, this
actually increased facial bias in verdicts. Together, our findings highlight the persistent influence of trait im-
pressions from faces on legal sentencing decisions.
People spontaneously infer a wide range of characteristics from a
person's facial appearance. Demographic characteristics, such as a
person's sex, age, or race, are perceived with near-perfect accuracy
(Bruce & Young, 2012). Even perceptually ambiguous categories, such
as sexual identity, social class, or political orientation can be detected at
rates higher than chance (Alaei & Rule, 2016; Tskhay & Rule, 2013).
People also infer personality traits from facial appearance (Todorov,
Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Stereotypes regarding what a trust-
worthy or competent person looks like are widely shared, but evidence
for their accuracy is mixed at best (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-
Siedlecki, 2015). Some studies suggest that personality impressions
contain a small “kernel of truth” (Berry, 1990; Penton-Voak, Pound,
Little, & Perrett, 2006). For example, a series of studies by Bonnefon,
Hopfensitz, and De Neys (2013, 2017) showed that people can judge
the trustworthiness of potential interaction partners at rates slightly
higher than chance (ca. 55%). However, other studies found no accu-
racy in trustworthiness impressions (Efferson & Vogt, 2013; Rule,
Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013) and evidence on the accuracy of
other personality trait impressions (e.g., extraversion) is also mixed
(Ames, Kammrath, Suppes, & Bolger, 2010; Jones, Kramer, & Ward,
2012; Kramer & Ward, 2010; Penton-Voak et al., 2006; Shevlin, Walker,
Davies, Banyard, & Lewis, 2003). Although more research is needed to
determine which personality traits can be judged with some level of
accuracy, the current evidence suggests that people's ability to infer
personality traits from faces is very limited at best.
Yet, research has shown that facial stereotypes guide many con-
sequential decisions such as personnel selection, voting behavior, and
economic exchange (Olivola, Funk, & Todorov, 2014). People even rely
on trait impressions when more diagnostic cues are available (Olivola,
Tingley, & Todorov, 2018; Rule, Bjornsdottir, Tskhay, & Ambady, 2016;
Rule, Tskhay, Freeman, & Ambady, 2014), and when there are explicit
rules that proscribe relying on a person's physical appearance (e.g., in
legal sentencing; Wilson & Rule, 2015, 2016; Zebrowitz & McDonald,
1991). This overreliance on trait impressions from faces can lead to
worse outcomes for decision-makers (Olivola & Todorov, 2010), but
also to systematic discrimination against people with a certain facial
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appearance. For instance, competent-looking people are favored as
business leaders, even though they do not seem to perform better
(Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2017; Ling, Luo, & She, 2019; Stoker,
Garretsen, & Spreeuwers, 2016). Trustworthiness impressions predict
capital punishment rulings despite their questionable accuracy (Wilson
& Rule, 2015, 2016). In short, people appear to overrely on facial ste-
reotypes when making a wide range of important decisions. As a con-
sequence, researchers have called for efforts to mitigate the biasing
influence of facial stereotypes (Olivola et al., 2014; Porter, ten Brinke, &
Gustaw, 2010; Wilson & Rule, 2015). Here, we answer this call by ex-
ploring the effectiveness of two types of interventions in reducing re-
liance on facial stereotypes.
1. Facial stereotypes influence decision-making
While there are numerous studies demonstrating the effects of facial
stereotypes, comparatively little is known about why people persistently
rely on trait impressions from faces. Addressing this question is crucial,
as an understanding of the underlying mechanism not only advances
theory, but is also a requirement for designing effective interventions.
Recently, two (non-mutually exclusive) hypotheses have been put for-
ward to address this gap. One explanation posits that the widespread
influence of trait impressions can be explained by lay beliefs in the
diagnostic value of facial appearance for inferring personality traits
(Jaeger, Evans, Stel, & van Beest, 2019b; Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola, &
Chater, 2012; Todorov, 2017). Many people believe in physiogno-
my—the idea that personality traits are reflected in an individual's fa-
cial appearance (Jaeger et al., 2019b; Suzuki, Tsukamoto, & Takahashi,
2017). Such beliefs may drive reliance on facial stereotypes because
how much people rely on a certain cue is usually not determined by
how predictive the cue actually is (i.e., how accurate trait impressions
are), but by how predictive people think the cue is (i.e., how accurate
people think their trait impressions are; Brunswik, 1956; Hammond,
Hursch, & Todd, 1964). In fact, individual differences in physiognomic
belief predict reliance on trait impressions when making economic trust
decisions (Jaeger et al., 2019b): People who more strongly believe that
trustworthiness is reflected in facial features rely more on their coun-
terpart's perceived trustworthiness when deciding whom to trust. Thus,
reliance on trait impressions may be driven by beliefs in the diagnostic
value of facial appearance for judging an individual's personality.
A second explanation posits that the intuitive accessibility of trait
impressions from faces can account for their persistent effects (Jaeger,
Evans, Stel, & van Beest, 2019a). Faces attract attention (Ro, Russell, &
Lavie, 2001; Theeuwes & Van der Stigchel, 2006) and are processed
quickly and efficiently (Stewart et al., 2012; Willis & Todorov, 2006).
This processing advantage leads to an intuitive accessibility of trait
impressions from faces. As a consequence, reliance on facial stereotypes
is relatively fast and not influenced by the restriction of cognitive ca-
pacities (Bonnefon et al., 2013; Jaeger et al., 2019a; Mieth, Bell, &
Buchner, 2016). Crucially, previous research has shown that people
favor readily available cues as they reduce decision effort (Evans &
Krueger, 2016; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Shah, 2007; Shah
& Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, people may rely on trait impressions from
faces because it allows them to make decisions relatively effortlessly.
2. Reducing reliance on facial stereotypes
To sum up, previous research suggests that the pervasive influence
of facial stereotypes is driven by a combination of (a) beliefs in the
diagnostic value of facial appearance for inferring personality traits and
(b) the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions from faces. Crucially,
similar mechanisms have been identified in other research areas that
investigate decision biases. Theories in the field of judgment and de-
cision-making often distinguish between two general sources of bias:
false beliefs (i.e., misconceptions) and automatically activated asso-
ciations (i.e., misleading intuitions; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2017;
Soll, Milkman, & Payne, 2014; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Moreover, so-
cial psychological theories of bias typically distinguish between explicit
and implicit expressions of bias (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, &
Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee,
Jordan, & Schwartz, 1998). Due to these similarities, we draw on the
extensive literature on debiasing techniques in judgment and decision-
making (Morewedge et al., 2015; Soll et al., 2014) and social psy-
chology (Forscher et al., 2019; Lai et al., 2014) to design interventions
aimed at reducing reliance on facial stereotypes.
A prominent strategy for reducing biases caused by misconceptions
is to challenge beliefs through education (Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson,
& Albarracín, 2017; Soll et al., 2014). For example, educating people
about compound interest can increase saving behavior (McKenzie &
Liersch, 2011), educating people about cognitive biases can lead to
more rational clinical decision-making (Hershberger, Markert, Part,
Cohen, & Finger, 1997), and raising awareness of prejudice based on
social group affiliation can reduce discrimination (Axt, Casola, & Nosek,
2018). Directly confronting participants with their stereotypes—rather
than just raising awareness about the existence of stereotypes in gen-
eral—has also been shown to reduce biased behavior (Czopp, Monteith,
& Mark, 2006; Parker, Monteith, Moss-Racusin, & Van Camp, 2018). In
Study 1, we therefore test whether we can reduce reliance on trait
impressions by educating people about the influence of facial stereo-
types or by confronting them with the fact that their facial stereotypes
are not accurate.
A prominent strategy for reducing biases caused by intuitively
available information is to design decision environments in such a way
that participants are nudged to rely on the “right” cues (Soll et al.,
2014; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The primary and efficient processing of
faces leads to a quick availability of face-based impressions (Freeman &
Johnson, 2016; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Willis &
Todorov, 2006). Crucially, information that is available first often ex-
erts a disproportionate influence on decisions (Asch, 1946; Dimov &
Link, 2017; Sullivan, 2018). Initial response tendencies are not suffi-
ciently adjusted based on subsequently processed information (produ-
cing anchoring effects; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974) and people are sometimes not able or willing to exert the cog-
nitive effort required to integrate all available information (Shah &
Oppenheimer, 2008; Simon, 1955). As a consequence, people often
make decisions based on the cue that was processed first in order to
reduce decision effort (Gigerenzer et al., 2008). This implies that ma-
nipulating how deeply and in which order information is processed
could reduce the influence of facial stereotypes (Ghaffari & Fiedler,
2018). In Study 2, we therefore test whether preventing the primary
processing of faces by presenting information sequentially (with faces
being displayed after more relevant information) reduces reliance on
facial stereotypes. We also test the effectiveness of prompting partici-
pants to make reflective rather than intuitive decisions.
We are not the first to test how different factors influence reliance
on facial stereotypes. Providing information on how trustworthy a
person has been in the past (Rezlescu et al., 2012) or giving feedback
about a person's trustworthiness in a repeated interaction (Yu, Saleem,
& Gonzalez, 2014) has been shown to reduce reliance on facial trust-
worthiness. In a similar vein, simply omitting photos from the decision-
making environment would obviously eliminate any influence of facial
appearance. These strategies may be effective, but they are not viable
interventions in most real-world situations. When deciding on the
culpability of a defendant or on the suitability of a job candidate, de-
cision-makers are often faced with a limited amount of ambiguous or
contradicting pieces of information, and it may not be possible to
provide additional information about past behavior. It might also not be
possible to completely remove information about a person's appear-
ance. For these reasons, and in contrast to previous work, we focused on
interventions that do not omit or add any additional decision-relevant
information. Our goal was to test the effectiveness of different inter-
ventions under conditions that resemble the real-world situations in
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which the biasing effect of trait impressions from faces is particularly
prevalent and problematic (e.g., in criminal sentencing, personnel se-
lection, or voting).
3. The current studies
Here, we examine the effectiveness of different interventions in
reducing the effect of facial stereotypes on legal sentencing decisions.
We focus on decision-making in a legal context, because sentencing
decisions can be immensely consequential, making biased decision-
making particularly problematic. Appearance-based stereotyping un-
dermines people's right to a fair trial (Lown, 1977). Yet, a host of stu-
dies has shown that facial stereotypes influence many real-life legal
outcomes (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Eberhardt, Davies,
Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Porter et al., 2010; Wilson & Rule,
2015, 2016; Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991).
Similar to Zebrowitz and McDonald (1991), we focus on sentencing
decisions in small claims court. Small claims court judges hear civil
cases in which people can sue private citizens for relatively small
amounts of money (e.g., up to $5000; the exact amount varies across
countries). Plaintiffs and defendants often represent themselves and the
evidence presented to the judge tends to be limited. However, the
burden of proof is also relaxed in small claims cases: Plaintiffs do not
need to present evidence that implicates the defendant “beyond rea-
sonable doubt”, but judges rule in favor of the party that presents the
most credible and convincing arguments. Given that small claims rul-
ings reflect a more subjective interpretation of the evidence by the
judge, it is possible that sentences are influenced by facial stereotypes.
In fact, Zebrowitz and McDonald (1991) showed that babyfacedness—a
facial feature that is correlated with perceived trustworthiness (Berry &
Zebrowitz McArthur, 1986; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1992)—predicted
outcomes of small claims court rulings. Babyfaced defendants were
found guilty less often (although this effect was only found for cases
involving intentional, rather than negligent actions). Furthermore,
when facing a babyfaced plaintiff, defendants that were found guilty
had to pay a smaller fraction of the damages when they looked more
babyfaced themselves. These results suggest that babyfaced individuals,
who are generally seen as trustworthy, honest, and kind (Berry &
Zebrowitz McArthur, 1986; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1992), experience
more leniency in court.
We present the results of three studies. All data, materials, pre-
registrations, and analysis scripts are available at the Open Science
Framework (https://osf.io/h4yf3/). We report how our sample sizes
were determined, all data exclusions, and all measures. In a pretest
(n = 320), we develop and validate a legal sentencing paradigm that
measures reliance on facial stereotypes. We examine whether the facial
trustworthiness of plaintiffs and defendants influences sentencing de-
cisions in small claims court cases. We then test the effectiveness of two
types of interventions in reducing reliance on trait impressions in two
preregistered studies. In Study 1 (n = 979), we educate participants
about the low diagnostic value of facial appearance for inferring per-
sonality traits. In Study 2 (n = 975), we change the decision-making
environment to disrupt the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions.
4. Pretest
We created a novel legal sentencing task, tailored to measure re-
liance on facial stereotypes. Previous experimental studies have pre-
dominantly taken two methodological approaches. In some studies,
participants view a series of face images and indicate perceptions of
culpability or sentencing decisions (e.g., Wilson & Rule, 2016). Multiple
trials with within-subjects manipulations of facial appearance increase
statistical power, but providing little or no background information on
the cases limits the ecological validity of the task. In other studies,
participants receive realistic case descriptions including relevant ex-
tenuating or aggravating facts (e.g., Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988;
Gunnell & Ceci, 2010). This approach more closely resembles the
conditions in which decisions are made in real life. However, these
studies usually consist of between-subject designs with few cases and
face images, limiting statistical power and the generalizability of the
results.
Here, we tried to incorporate advantages of the two approaches.
Based on descriptions of real small claims court cases, we created ten
fictitious case files, with plaintiffs filing suits against defendants. Cases
included realistic evidence and we manipulated the perceived trust-
worthiness of plaintiffs and defendants in a within-subjects design.
Participants indicated sentencing decisions for all ten cases. In line with
previous studies (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988; Wilson & Rule,
2016), we expected participants to find defendants guilty more often
when they look untrustworthy (vs. trustworthy). We also measured
confidence in verdicts and, in case participants ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, the damages they wished to award to the plaintiff. This al-
lowed us to explore whether congruence between sentences and facial
stereotypes (e.g., a guilty verdict for untrustworthy defendants) would
increase confidence in verdicts. Moreover, we explored whether un-
trustworthy-looking defendants are punished twice, by being more
likely to be found guilty and by receiving a harsher sentence (i.e., being
ordered to pay more damages).
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
We recruited a total of 363 U.S. American workers from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) who participated
in exchange for $1.50. Data from 30 participants (8.26%) who failed an
attention check at the end of the study and 8 participants (2.40%) who
indicated having only a poor or basic English proficiency were excluded
from analysis, leaving a final sample of 325 participants (50.46% fe-
male, Mage = 35.91, SDage = 10.03).
4.1.2. Materials
We created case files for ten fictitious small claims court cases (see
Fig. 1). Case files included a photo and demographic information on the
plaintiff and the defendant. All individuals were White male U.S. citi-
zens and had their first and last name redacted. Case files also included
the size of the plaintiff's claim (ranging from $600 to $3600) and a case
summary of approximately 130 words. Each summary mentioned the
reason why the plaintiff was suing the defendant (e.g., seeking re-
imbursement for a damaged stereo system) and the evidence that was
presented by the plaintiff and the defendant (e.g., photos of a broken
speaker, a receipt confirming the purchase of a stereo system). In line
with real-world small claims court cases, the evidence presented by
both sides was relatively limited.
We selected 20 images of White male individuals from the Chicago
Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). The database in-
cludes ratings of all targets on various trait dimensions. We selected the
ten individuals who received the lowest (M = 2.62, SD = 0.17) and
highest (M = 3.78, SD = 0.09) ratings on perceived trustworthiness.
Targets varied in perceived age with average age ratings ranging from
19.5 to 43.2 years (M = 28.60, SD = 6.90). Age ratings of the trust-
worthy-looking targets (M = 28.67, SD = 6.64) and untrustworthy-
looking targets (M = 28.57, SD = 7.50) were very similar.
Next, we manipulated the perceived trustworthiness of all targets.
Oosterhof and Todorov (2008) created a series of computer-generated
face prototypes that reflect the typical facial appearance of targets
varying on several trait dimensions (e.g., trustworthiness, dominance).
We selected two face prototypes that reflect a high (i.e., three standard
deviations above the mean) and low (i.e. three standard deviations
below the mean) score on perceived trustworthiness. Using Psycho-
morph (Tiddeman, Burt, & Perrett, 2001), we transformed each target's
face shape towards the face shape of the computer-generated prototype
by 60%. Trustworthy-looking targets were morphed with the
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trustworthy-looking face prototype, whereas untrustworthy-looking
targets were morphed with the untrustworthy-looking face prototype.
This procedure somewhat exaggerated the facial features linked to
perceptions of trustworthiness and allowed us to create prototypically
(un-)trustworthy-looking individuals without compromising the rea-
listic nature of the face stimuli.
Finally, we matched case files and face images. Each case featured a
plaintiff and a defendant differing on perceived trustworthiness: One
individual looked trustworthy while the other looked untrustworthy.
We created four sets of stimuli. Each set contained all ten case files and
all 20 face images. In each set, face images were randomly matched to a
case and a role (i.e., plaintiff or defendant). Half of all cases featured a
trustworthy-looking plaintiff and an untrustworthy-looking defendant,
while the roles were reversed in the other half.
4.1.3. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four stimulus
sets. To measure sentencing decisions, participants were instructed to
carefully read each case and to indicate a sentence by ruling in favor of
the plaintiff or the defendant. After each ruling, participants also in-
dicated their confidence in the ruling on a scale that ranged from 1 (not
confident at all) to 9 (extremely confident). In case participants ruled in
favor of the plaintiff, they were asked to indicate the amount of da-
mages that the plaintiff should be awarded on a scale that ranged from
50% to 100% (in steps of 10%) of the original claim.
4.1.4. Sensitivity analysis
We conducted a post hoc sensitivity analysis to determine the
smallest effect size we were able to detect for our main effect of interest
(the effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts) with 80% power (and
α = 5%). As software commonly used for sensitivity analyses, such as
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), does not support
multilevel data, we relied on the simr package (Green & Macleod, 2016)
in R (R Core Team, 2019). The package provides power estimates for
fixed effects in multilevel regression models. We systematically varied
the effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts and calculated power at
each level, to test which effect size we were able to detect with at least
80% power. This showed that we had 80% power to detect an odds
ratio of 1.27 for the effect of facial trustworthiness on verdict. To il-
lustrate, an odds ratio of this size corresponds to a six percentage point
difference in guilty verdicts (e.g., 50% vs. 56%) for trustworthy-looking
versus untrustworthy-looking defendants.
4.2. Results
On average, participants found the defendant guilty 53.26% of the
time (SD = 18.54%). Two participants (0.62%) found all defendants
guilty, whereas three (0.92%) found none guilty. The prevalence of
guilty verdicts varied across cases (Min = 34.15%, Max = 71.08%,
M = 53.26%, SD = 13.12%).
We analyzed the effect of facial trustworthiness on sentencing de-
cisions by estimating a multilevel regression model with random in-
tercepts and slopes per participant and per case. This accounts for
variation in the overall rate of guilty verdicts across participants (i.e.,
some participants indicating more guilty verdicts than others) and
across cases (i.e., defendants in some cases receiving more guilty ver-
dicts than others). Regressing verdict (0 = defendant is not guilty,
1 = defendant is guilty) on facial trustworthiness
Fig. 1. A case file with a trustworthy-looking plaintiff and an untrustworthy-looking defendant.
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(−0.5 = trustworthy-looking defendant, 0.5 = untrustworthy-looking
defendant) revealed a positive effect, β = 0.319, SE = 0.080, z = 3.94,
p < .001, 95% CI [0.161, 0.477], OR = 1.38. The rate of guilty ver-
dicts was 8.03 percentage points higher for untrustworthy-looking de-
fendants (56.65% vs. 48.61%).
We also explored whether defendants' facial trustworthiness af-
fected confidence in verdicts or the amount of money participants
awarded to the plaintiff in case of a guilty verdict. Regressing con-
fidence on facial trustworthiness, verdict, and their interaction showed
a positive effect of a guilty verdict, β = 0.243, SE = 0.052, t
(3016) = 4.75, p < .001, 95% CI [0.142, 0.344]. Participants were
more confident in their verdicts when they ruled in favor of the
plaintiff. There was no effect of facial trustworthiness, β = −0.020,
SE = 0.071, t(1,099) = 0.29, p= .77, 95% CI [−0.159, 0.118], and no
interaction effect between verdict and facial trustworthiness,
β = 0.088, SE = 0.099, t(2990) = 0.89, p = .37, 95% CI [−0.106,
0.281].
Finally, regressing the amount of money that was awarded to the
plaintiff in case of a guilty verdict on facial trustworthiness revealed a
small positive effect, β = 1.655, SE = 0.727, t(137.4) = 2.28,
p = .024, 95% CI [0.191, 3.078]. Participants awarded the plaintiff
1.63 percentage points more of their original claim when the defendant
looked untrustworthy (85.28% vs. 83.64%).
4.3. Discussion
Results of the pretest showed that legal sentencing decisions were
influenced by the facial trustworthiness of the involved parties. The rate
of guilty verdicts was 8.03 percentage points higher when the de-
fendant looked untrustworthy (vs. trustworthy). Facial trustworthiness
also influenced how much money participants awarded to the plaintiff
in case of a guilty verdict, with plaintiffs receiving 1.63 percentage
points more when they were suing an untrustworthy-looking (vs.
trustworthy-looking) defendant. We did not find any evidence that
confidence in verdicts was influenced by facial trustworthiness. Thus,
using a novel sentencing task with multiple cases and controlled ma-
nipulations of facial trustworthiness, we replicate prior work showing
that people rely on trait impressions from faces when making legal
sentencing decisions (Porter et al., 2010; Wilson & Rule, 2015, 2016).
Our findings also replicate previous work by Zebrowitz and McDonald
(1991) who found that babyfacedness—a facial feature that is corre-
lated with perceived trustworthiness (Berry & Zebrowitz McArthur,
1986; Zebrowitz & Montepare, 1992) —influenced verdicts and
awarded damages in real-world small claims cases.
5. Study 1: belief interventions
In Study 1, we used the sentencing task that was developed and
validated in the pretest to test the effectiveness of an intervention in
reducing reliance on facial trustworthiness. Our goal was to reduce
reliance on facial stereotypes by reducing explicit beliefs that person-
ality can be judged from facial appearance (Jaeger et al., 2019b). In one
condition, participants read a text that informed them about scientific
research on facial stereotypes. The text mentioned the automatic ac-
cessibility of facial stereotypes, that facial stereotypes are usually not
accurate, and that relying on them can result in worse decision-making
outcomes. The intervention specifically focused on facial stereotypes, as
previous work suggests that raising awareness of stereotypes in general
may not be effective (Axt et al., 2018). Our manipulation was modelled
after previous research in the domain of lay beliefs. For instance, Levy,
Stroessner, and Dweck (1998) used fake scientific articles to manipulate
beliefs in the innateness of personality traits and this influenced how
strongly participants associated different social groups with stereo-
typical personality traits.
In a second intervention condition, we additionally confronted
participants with the low diagnostic value of their facial stereotypes.
Before reading the educational text, we showed participants ten pairs of
faces. Their task was to identify which of the two individuals was a
convicted felon. We told participants that they only guessed four out of
ten correctly, meaning that their guesses were not better than chance.
We measured physiognomic beliefs (i.e., participants' explicit beliefs
that personality traits can be judged accurately from faces) in all con-
ditions and hypothesized that, compared to a control condition in
which participants were not exposed to a manipulation, both inter-
ventions would reduce physiognomic beliefs and reliance on facial
trustworthiness when making sentencing decisions.
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Power analysis
We conducted an a priori power analysis using the simr package in
R, which allows one to test how power varies as a function of the
number of levels of a random effect (in our case, the number of parti-
cipants or the number of cases). As the number of cases was fixed, we
tested how power varies across different numbers of participants.
Calculating power across a wide range of sample sizes showed that 250
participants per condition are required to detect a 30% decrease in the
effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts with 80% power (and
α = 5%). As a conservative measure, we decided to recruit 325 par-
ticipants per condition.
5.1.2. Participants
We recruited a total of 1249 US American workers from Amazon
Mechanical Turk who participated in exchange for $2.50. Data from
227 participants (18.17%) who failed an attention check at the end of
the study and from 42 participants (4.11%) who indicated poor or basic
English proficiency were excluded from analysis, leaving a final sample
of 979 participants (47.40% female, Mage = 36.14, SDage = 11.24).
5.1.3. Materials & procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions. In
all conditions, participants completed the legal sentencing task as de-
scribed in the previous study. For each case, they ruled in favor of the
plaintiff or the defendant and indicated their confidence in the ruling
on a scale that ranged from 1 (not confident at all) to 9 (extremely con-
fident). Next, to measure belief in the visibility of personality traits in
facial appearance, participants completed the physiognomic belief scale
(Jaeger et al., 2019b). Participants were prompted to imagine seeing
the passport photo of a stranger. They were asked to indicate how much
they agree with three statements (e.g., I can learn something about a
person's personality just from looking at his or her face) on a scale from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Average scores across the
three items constituted our measure of physiognomic beliefs (Cronba-
ch's α = 0.84).
The three conditions only differed in the texts participants were
exposed to prior to completing the sentencing task. In the education
condition (n = 332), participants read an educational text about per-
sonality impressions from faces that was approximately 300 words
long. First, participants were told that people spontaneously form im-
pressions of others' personality based on their facial appearance; that
there is substantial agreement on what, for example, a trustworthy
person looks like; and that these judgments are formed very quickly,
sometimes without the perceiver's awareness. To illustrate these points,
participants were shown two face images of a typical trustworthy-
looking and untrustworthy-looking face (drawn from a database of
computer-generated faces varying in perceived trustworthiness;
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Next, the text mentioned that trust-
worthiness impressions influence many important decisions even
though research suggests that these impressions are often inaccurate. It
was also highlighted that this is problematic because it leads to unfair
treatment of people with a certain facial appearance (the exact text can
be found in the online materials).
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In the education-and-confrontation condition (n = 332), prior to
reading the educational text, participants completed an additional task
that was designed to demonstrate that their face-based impressions are
inaccurate. Participants saw ten pairs of faces of male individuals that
were taken from the 10k Faces Database (Bainbridge, Isola, Blank, &
Oliva, 2013). Participants were told that each pair included one con-
victed felon and that their task was to identify that person. Feedback
about accuracy was standardized across all participants. They were told
that they only guessed four out of ten correctly, meaning that their
guesses were not better than chance.
In the control condition (n = 315), participants read a text about
the geography of Scotland.
After reading the respective texts, participants answered three
comprehension check questions (e.g., research shows that first impressions
influence many important decisions). Participants could only proceed to
the sentencing task after having answered all three questions correctly.
5.2. Results
Participants found the defendant guilty 51.47% of the time
(SD= 17.47%). Three participants (0.31%) found all defendants guilty,
whereas four (0.41%) found none guilty. The prevalence of guilty
verdicts varied across cases (Min = 36.26%, Max = 63.53%,
M = 51.47%, SD = 10.40%).
5.2.1. Physiognomic beliefs
First, we tested whether the interventions reduced beliefs that
personality is reflected in facial appearance. Compared to participants
in the control condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.37), participants in the
education condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.33) indicated lower physiog-
nomic beliefs, t(640.6) = 2.03, p = .042, d = 0.16, and so did parti-
cipants in the education-and-confrontation condition (M = 3.50,
SD = 1.38), t(643.5) = 2.80, p = .005, d = 0.22. Physiognomic beliefs
did not significantly differ between the education and education-and-
confrontation condition, t(661.2) = 0.82, p = .41, d = 0.06. These
results show that both interventions were successful in reducing the
belief that personality is reflected in facial features, although differ-
ences were relatively small.
5.2.2. Sentencing decisions
Next, we tested whether the interventions reduced reliance on facial
trustworthiness in the legal sentencing task. We estimated a multilevel
regression model with random intercepts and slopes per participant and
case. Regressing verdict (0 = defendant is not guilty, 1 = defendant is
guilty) on facial trustworthiness (−0.5 = trustworthy-looking de-
fendant, 0.5 = untrustworthy-looking defendant), condition (with the
control condition being the reference category), and their interaction
terms revealed a positive effect of facial trustworthiness, β = 0.327,
SE = 0.101, z = 3.22, p = .001, 95% CI [0.127, 0.527], OR = 1.39.
There were no significant differences in guilty verdicts between the
control condition and the education condition, β = 0.107, SE = 0.061,
z = 1.74, p = .083 95% CI [−0.014, 0.227], OR = 1.11, or the edu-
cation-and-confrontation condition, β = 0.059, SE = 0.061, z = 0.96,
p = .34, 95% CI [−0.062, 0.179], OR = 1.06. The difference between
the education condition and the education-and-confrontation condition
was also not significant, β = −0.048, SE = 0.061, z = 0.79, p = .43,
95% CI [−0.167, 0.071], OR = 0.95.
Crucially, examining the interaction effects showed that, compared
to the control condition, the effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts
was not significantly different in the education condition, β = 0.132,
SE = 0.133, z = 0.99, p = .32, 95% CI [0.130, 0.395], OR = 1.14, or
in the education-and-confrontation condition, β = −0.056,
SE = 0.134, z = 0.42, p = .68, 95% CI [−0.318, 0.207], OR = 0.95
(see Fig. 2). The difference between the education condition and the
education-and-confrontation condition was also not significant,
β = −0.188, SE = 0.132, z = 1.42, p = .16, 95% CI [−0.448, 0.072],
OR = 0.83.1 Thus, neither intervention was successful in reducing re-
liance on facial trustworthiness. The rate of guilty verdicts was 7.78
percentage points higher for untrustworthy-looking defendants in the
control condition (54.76% vs. 46.98%), 11.34 percentage points higher
in the education condition (58.71% vs. 47.37%), and 6.65 percentage
points higher in the education-and-confrontation condition (54.69% vs.
48.04%).
5.2.3. Confidence in verdicts
We also tested whether the interventions influenced confidence in
verdicts. Regressing confidence on facial trustworthiness, verdict, and
condition yielded a positive effect of a guilty verdict, β = 0.180,
SE = 0.030, t(9,076) = 5.99, p < .001, 95% CI [0.120, 0.238]. As in
our pretest, participants were more confident in their verdicts when
they found the defendant guilty. There was no effect of facial trust-
worthiness, β = 0.033, SE = 0.049, t(6.25) = 0.68, p = .52, 95% CI
[−0.070, 0.136], and compared to the control condition, confidence
was not significantly different in the education condition, β = −0.001,
SE = 0.091, t(973.0) = 0.01, p = .99, 95% CI [−0.180, 0.178], or in
the education-and-confrontation condition, β = −0.145, SE = 0.091, t
(973.4) = 1.59, p = .11, 95% CI [−0.323, 0.034]. In other words, we
did not find evidence that the interventions reduced confidence in
verdicts.
5.2.4. Exploratory analyses
To further probe the effects of the two interventions, we conducted
Bayesian analyses using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder,
2018) in R (R Core Team, 2019). Bayesian t-tests with default Cauchy
priors yielded substantial support for the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence between the control condition and the education condition,
BF01 = 6.49, and strong support for the null hypothesis of no difference
between the control condition and the education-and-confrontation
condition, BF01 = 10.66. These results support the conclusion that
neither intervention significantly reduced reliance on facial trust-
worthiness.
The interventions were based on a proposed link between belief in
the visibility of personality in a person's facial appearance and reliance
on trait impressions when making decisions (Jaeger et al., 2019b). Even
though the interventions somewhat reduced physiognomic beliefs, they
did not reduce reliance on facial trustworthiness, raising the question
Fig. 2. Differences in rates of guilty verdicts for trustworthy-looking and un-
trustworthy-looking defendants as a function of condition. Dots denote pre-
dicted values. Error bars denote bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
1 Comparing the control condition against a combination of both intervention
conditions also yielded no significant difference in the effect of facial trust-
worthiness on verdicts, β = 0.038, SE = 0.116, z = 0.33, p = .74, 95% CI
[−0.190, 0.267], OR = 1.04.
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whether physiognomic beliefs were actually related to reliance on facial
trustworthiness. To test this, we extracted participant-specific slopes for
the effect of facial trustworthiness from our multilevel regression
models, as an indicator of how much each participant relied on trait
impressions when making sentencing decisions. There was indeed a
significant correlation between physiognomic beliefs and reliance on
facial trustworthiness, r(977) = 0.200, p < .001. There was also a
positive correlation between physiognomic beliefs and confidence in
verdicts, r(977) = 0.204, p < .001. Participants who more strongly
endorsed the belief that personality is reflected in facial features relied
more on facial trustworthiness when making sentencing decisions and
they were more confident in their verdicts. These results rule out the
explanation that the observed reduction in physiognomic beliefs did not
translate to less biased sentencing decisions because there was no link
between beliefs and behavior.
5.3. Discussion
Neither intervention successfully reduced the effect of facial ste-
reotypes on sentencing decisions. Educating participants about the low
accuracy of their trait impressions reduced explicit beliefs in the diag-
nostic value of facial appearance for inferring personality traits, but this
effect was relatively small. Importantly, the intervention did not reduce
reliance on facial stereotypes when making sentencing decisions and it
did not reduce confidence in verdicts. The same pattern was observed
for a second intervention: Even when participants were directly con-
fronted with the low accuracy their trait impressions, they continued to
rely on them when making decisions in a subsequent task.
6. Study 2: accessibility interventions
In Study 2, we tested the effectiveness of an alternative intervention
in reducing reliance on facial trustworthiness. Trait impressions from
faces are intuitively accessible (Stewart et al., 2012; Todorov et al.,
2009; Willis & Todorov, 2006) and accessible information often exerts a
disproportionate influence on decisions (Shah, 2007; Simmons &
Nelson, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). To disrupt the primary
processing of faces, we presented information sequentially. First, par-
ticipants saw only case-relevant information and indicated an initial
verdict. Then, they saw the entire case file (which also included face
images of the plaintiff and defendant) and indicated their final verdict.
We hypothesized that the majority of participants would not revise
their initial verdicts. Reliance on intuitively available trait impressions
constitutes a low-effort decision strategy and people might not be aware
of the extent to which their decisions are influenced by facial stereo-
types (Jaeger et al., 2019a). In our sequential design, participants have
to actively revise their verdict (and ignore case-relevant information) if
they want to base their decisions on the parties' facial appearance. They
might be reluctant to do so because sticking with their initial verdict
should reduce decision effort (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; Simon,
1955). Any initial verdict that is not revised reflects a verdict that is
unbiased by facial stereotypes, as participants were not exposed to face
images when deciding on their initial verdicts. Thus, if the majority of
initial verdicts are not overturned, this should reduce the overall in-
fluence of facial stereotypes on verdicts compared to a control condition
in which participants do not make decisions sequentially and are ex-
posed to the face images right away.
In a second intervention condition, we tested whether the influence
of intuitively available trait impressions would be further reduced by
prompting participants to make reflective decisions (Newman, Gibb, &
Thompson, 2017). To ensure that initial verdicts are based on a careful
consideration of the case-relevant information, participants had to re-




Based on the results of the power analysis reported in Study 1, we
again decided to recruit 325 participants per condition. We recruited a
total of 1085 U.S. American workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk
who participated in exchange for $2.50. Data from 93 participants
(8.57%) who failed an attention check at the end of the study and from
17 participants (1.71%) who indicated a poor or basic English profi-
ciency were excluded from analysis, leaving a final sample of 975
participants (49.74% female, Mage = 35.86, SDage = 10.50).
6.1.2. Materials & procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions. In
all conditions, participants completed the legal sentencing task as de-
scribed in our Pretest. For each case, they ruled in favor of the plaintiff
or the defendant and indicated their confidence in the ruling on a scale
that ranged from 1 (not confident at all) to 9 (extremely confident).
In the sequential condition (n = 319), participants first saw the case
files without any personal information about the plaintiff or defendant
and were asked to indicate an initial ruling in favor of the plaintiff or
the defendant. Next, participants saw the entire case files, including the
images of the plaintiff and defendant, and were asked to indicate their
final ruling and their confidence in the ruling on a scale that ranged
from 1 (not confident at all) to 9 (extremely confident).
In the sequential-and-reflection condition (n = 329), participants
followed the same procedure as in the sequential condition, but they
were prompted to think carefully and make reflective decisions for all
cases (Newman et al., 2017). They could only indicate an initial ruling
after 30 s had passed and they were instructed to take at least this long
to carefully study the case summary before indicating a ruling.
In the control condition (n = 327), participants completed the legal
sentencing task without the order of stimuli being manipulated.
6.2. Results
Participants found the defendant guilty 52.01% of the time
(SD = 16.44%). Five participants (0.51%) found all defendants guilty,
whereas four (0.41%) found none guilty. The prevalence of guilty
verdicts varied across cases (Min = 31.01%, Max = 69.23%,
M = 52.02%, SD = 13.52%).
6.2.1. Response times
First, we analyzed response times for initial rulings to check whe-
ther instructions to reflect on decisions in the sequential-and-reflection
condition actually led to longer decision times compared to the se-
quential condition. Response times were log10-transformed due to their
right-skewed distribution. A t-test showed that participants in the se-
quential-and-reflection condition (M= 1.658, SD = 0.111) took longer
to reach a decision compared to participants the sequential condition
(M = 1.527, SD = 0.273), t(417.5) = 7.93, p < .001, d = 0.62.2
6.2.2. Sentencing decisions
Next, we tested whether our interventions reduced reliance on facial
trustworthiness in the legal sentencing task. We estimated a multilevel
regression model with random intercepts and slopes per participant and
case. Regressing verdict (0 = defendant is not guilty, 1 = defendant is
guilty) on facial trustworthiness (−0.5 = trustworthy-looking de-
fendant, 0.5 = untrustworthy-looking defendant), condition (with the
control condition being the reference category), and their interaction
terms revealed a positive effect of facial trustworthiness, β = 0.218,
2 Excluding 63 raw response times (0.65%) that were more than three stan-
dard deviations above the mean response time before log10-transforming the
data produced a similar result.
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SE = 0.105, z = 2.08, p = .038, 95% CI [0.005, 0.431], OR = 1.24.
There were no significant differences in rates of guilty verdicts between
the control condition (50.89%) and the sequential condition (52.97%),
β = 0.095, SE = 0.058, z = 1.65, p = .10 95% CI [−0.018, 0.209],
OR = 1.10, or the sequential-and-reflection condition (52.20%),
β = 0.060, SE = 0.057, z = 1.05, p = .30, 95% CI [−0.053, 0.173],
OR = 1.06. The difference between the sequential condition and the
sequential-and-reflection condition was also not significant,
β = −0.081, SE = 0.117, z = 0.69, p = .49, 95% CI [−0.310, 0.148],
OR = 0.92.3
Crucially, we found that, compared to the control condition, the
effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts was significantly larger in the
sequential condition, β= 0.529, SE = 0.116, z = 4.54, p < .001, 95%
CI [0.301, 0.758], OR = 1.70, and in the sequential-and-reflection
condition, β = 0.448, SE = 0.115, z = 3.88, p < .001, 95% CI [0.222,
0.675], OR = 1.56 (see Fig. 3). The difference between the sequential
condition and the sequential-and-reflection condition was not sig-
nificant, β=−0.081, SE= 0.117, z= 0.69, p= .49, 95% CI [−0.310,
0.148], OR = 0.92. Thus, contrary to our predictions, both interven-
tions significantly increased the influence of facial trustworthiness. The
rate of guilty verdicts was 5.40 percentage points higher for un-
trustworthy-looking defendants in the control condition (53.51% vs.
48.11% guilty verdicts), 18.40 percentage points higher in the se-
quential condition (62.25% vs. 43.85% guilty verdicts), and 16.81
percentage points higher the sequential-and-reflection condition
(60.54% vs. 43.73% guilty verdicts).
6.2.3. Confidence in verdicts
We also tested whether the interventions influenced confidence in
verdicts. Regressing confidence on facial trustworthiness, verdict, and
condition yielded no effect of facial trustworthiness, β = 0.042,
SE = 0.065, t(8.58) = 0.65, p = .54, 95% CI[−0.092, 0.177], but a
positive effect of a guilty verdict, β = 0.086, SE = 0.030, t
(9,023) = 2.81, p = .005, 95% CI [0.026, 0.145]. Participants were
more confident in their verdicts when they found the defendant guilty.
Compared to the control condition, confidence was significantly higher
in the sequential condition, β = 0.333, SE = 0.093, t(971.8) = 3.59,
p < .001, 95% CI [0.151, 0.515], and also in the sequential-and-re-
flection condition, β = 0.402, SE = 0.092, t(972.3) = 4.73, p < .001,
95% CI [0.222, 0.583]. There was no significant difference in con-
fidence between the sequential condition and the sequential-and-re-
flection condition β = 0.070, SE = 0.093, t(972.8) = 0.75, p = .45,
95% CI [−0.112, 0.251]. Thus, the interventions significantly in-
creased confidence in verdicts.
6.2.4. Exploratory analyses
To further probe the effects of the two interventions, we again
conducted Bayesian analyses. Bayesian t-tests with default Cauchy
priors yielded strong support for the alternative hypothesis that, com-
pared to the control condition, reliance on facial trustworthiness was
stronger in the sequential condition, BF10 = 1484, and in the sequen-
tial-and-reflection condition, BF10 = 188. These results support the
conclusion that both interventions significantly increased reliance on
facial trustworthiness.
Finally, we analyzed how often and under what conditions partici-
pants revised their initial decision to understand why the interventions
increased rather than decreased reliance on facial trustworthiness. We
hypothesized that most participants would not revise their initial de-
cisions, which were made in the absence of face images and therefore
unbiased by facial stereotypes. In fact, the majority of initial rulings in
the sequential condition (89.78%) and in sequential-and-reflection
condition (90.61%) were not revised when participants saw the images
of the plaintiff and defendant and had the chance to change their ver-
dict. However, analyzing revision rates showed that participants were
more likely to revise their initial ruling when it was not in line with face
stereotypes (e.g., a trustworthy-looking defendant being found guilty;
15.4%) than when it was already in line with stereotypes (3.14%),
χ2(1) = 310.2, p < .001. Of all revised rulings, 83.52% ended up
being congruent with face stereotypes whereas only 16.48% were in-
congruent with face stereotypes. As a consequence, while only 51.11%
of all initial rulings made in the absence of face images were in line with
face stereotypes, 57.61% of all final rulings made in the presence of face
images were, χ2(1) = 55.12, p < .001. In sum, in the absence of face
images, both interventions were successful in producing unbiased rul-
ings, which were seldom revised when participants did have access to
the face images. However, the wide majority of revisions that did occur
brought decisions in line with face stereotypes. This increased the
overall effect of facial trustworthiness on sentencing decisions.
6.3. Discussion
Results of Study 2 showed that both interventions increased, rather
than decreased, reliance on facial stereotypes. In order to disrupt the
primary processing of faces (and the intuitive accessibility of trait im-
pressions), we asked participants to indicate initial decisions that were
solely based on case-relevant information. They were then shown the
entire case file, which also included facial photographs of the plaintiff
and defendant, and they could still revise their sentencing decisions. As
intended, the majority of participants (ca. 90%) did not change their
initial sentences, which means that most sentences reflected decisions
that were made while being ignorant of the plaintiff's and defendant's
facial appearance. However, participants who decided to change their
initial decisions overwhelmingly did so to bring their final decisions in
line with facial stereotypes (e.g., by finding an untrustworthy-looking
defendant guilty). The same pattern was observed for a second inter-
vention in which participants were additionally prompted to make re-
flective decisions. Overall, this increased the influence of facial ste-
reotypes.
Fig. 3. Differences in rates of guilty verdicts for trustworthy-looking and un-
trustworthy-looking defendants as a function of condition. Dots denote pre-
dicted values. Error bars denote bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
3 We also compared the rate of guilty verdicts in participants' initial senten-
cing decisions (i.e., when they were not exposed to facial photographs).
Compared to the sequential condition (54.23%), participants in the sequential-
and-reflection condition indicated slightly fewer guilty verdicts (51.67%),
suggesting that instructing participants to reflect on their sentencing decisions
slightly decreased their likelihood of indicating a guilty verdict. However, this
difference was only marginally significant, β = −0.112, SE = 0.062, z = 1.82,
p = .069, 95% CI [−0.246, 0.018], OR = 0.89.
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7. Internal meta-analysis
To estimate the influence of facial trustworthiness on sentencing
decisions more precisely, we calculated the meta-analytic effect across
our three studies. We aggregated the data from all conditions that did
not feature an intervention (the pretest and the control conditions from
Study 1 and Study 2). This data set included almost 10000 sentencing
decisions (n = 967 participants, 48.09% female, Mage = 35.85,
SDage = 10.45). We estimated a multilevel regression model with
random intercepts and slopes per participant, per case, and per study.
This revealed a positive effect of facial trustworthiness on sentencing
decisions, β = 0.284, SE = 0.052, z = 5.46, p < .001, 95% CI [0.171,
0.398], OR = 1.33.4 Defendants were more likely to be found guilty for
the same transgression when they looked untrustworthy. The rate of
guilty verdicts was 6.88 percentage points higher for untrustworthy-
looking defendants (54.54% vs. 47.66%).
8. General discussion
The aim of the current investigation was to test the effectiveness of
different interventions in reducing the influence of facial stereotypes on
legal decision-making. We created a novel legal sentencing paradigm in
which participants indicated verdicts for multiple small claims court
cases and we manipulated the facial trustworthiness of plaintiffs and
defendants. In line with previous studies showing that trait impressions
from faces influence legal decision-making (Porter et al., 2010; Wilson
& Rule, 2016), we found that defendants were more likely to be found
guilty when they looked untrustworthy (vs. trustworthy). This effect
was observed in all three studies. In our pretest, we also examined
whether facial trustworthiness influences the fraction of damages that
defendants were ordered to pay in case of a guilty verdict. Again, un-
trustworthy-looking defendants experienced less leniency as they were
ordered to pay slightly more damages. Our results replicate previous
findings by Zebrowitz and McDonald (1991) who found that babyfa-
cedness—a facial feature that is correlated with perceived trust-
worthiness (Berry & Zebrowitz McArthur, 1986; Zebrowitz &
Montepare, 1992) —predicted verdicts and awarded damages. Cru-
cially, their findings were based on a large sample of real small claims
cases, which suggests that the current results may generalize beyond
our experimental design to real-world sentencing decisions.
We then tested the effectiveness of two debiasing techniques—e-
ducating decision-makers and changing the decision-making environ-
ment (Soll et al., 2014)—in reducing the influence of facial trust-
worthiness on verdicts. In Study 1, we attempted to reduce the
influence of facial stereotypes by educating people about the poor di-
agnostic value of their trait impressions. Specifically, we (a) educated
participants about the biasing influence of inaccurate facial stereotypes
and (b) confronted them with the low diagnostic value of their own trait
impressions. Although both manipulations succeeded in lowering be-
liefs that personality traits can be accurately inferred from a person's
facial appearance, they did not reduce the effect of facial stereotypes on
sentencing decisions. Bayesian analyses indicated strong support for the
null hypothesis of no difference between the control condition and the
intervention conditions. Thus, regardless of whether or not participants
were given clear information about the low diagnostic value of their
trait impressions from faces, sentencing decisions were influenced by
the facial trustworthiness of defendants.
In Study 2, we attempted to reduce the influence of facial stereo-
types by disrupting the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions. To
this end, we provided information sequentially. First, participants saw
only case-relevant information and indicated a preliminary sentence.
Then, participants saw the entire case file (including facial photo-
graphs) and indicated their final sentence. As intended, only a minority
of initial sentences (< 10%) were changed. However, sentence revi-
sions were strongly driven by facial stereotypes, with most revised
decisions reflecting a stereotype-congruent verdict (e.g., untrustworthy-
looking defendants being found guilty). On average, this actually in-
creased the influence of facial stereotypes on verdicts. A similar pattern
was observed when participants were additionally prompted to make
reflective decisions.
Together, our results highlight the persistent influence of facial
stereotypes on decision-making. Previous studies have shown that
people rely on trait impressions even when other, more diagnostic cues
are available (Jaeger et al., 2019a; Olivola et al., 2018; Olivola &
Todorov, 2010). In a similar vein, the present results demonstrate that
effects of trait impressions on decision-making persist even when par-
ticipants receive clear information about how inaccurate facial stereo-
types are (Study 1) and even when participants have to expand addi-
tional cognitive effort to rely on facial stereotypes (Study 2). Across all
interventions, we consistently found that untrustworthy-looking de-
fendants were more likely to be found guilty than trustworthy-looking
defendants.
8.1. Limitations and future directions
We acknowledge that our education intervention in Study 1 may not
have been strong enough to reduce behavioral reliance on facial ste-
reotypes. However, other studies employing similar manipulations
successfully reduced lay beliefs and related behaviors (Chiu, Hong, &
Dweck, 1997; Levy et al., 1998). For example, Levy et al. (1998) ex-
posed participants to short scientific articles written for a lay audience
to manipulate beliefs in the malleability of personality traits. The ma-
nipulation successfully influenced lay beliefs, but also the extent to
which participants relied on stereotypes when judging different social
groups. Regardless, our intervention only had a small effect on beliefs
and more intensive debiasing trainings might be necessary to change
behavior (for examples, see Devine, Forscher, & Austin, 2013; Sellier,
Scopelliti, & Morewedge, 2019).
One question that remains unanswered is why a later presentation
of photographs increased the influence of facial stereotypes. Studies on
the role of fluency in cue ordering (Dimov & Link, 2017), anchoring
effects (Tamir & Mitchell, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and
primacy effects in impression formation (Asch, 1946) all highlight the
strong influence of information that is processed first. However, other
investigations found a disproportionate influence of information that is
processed last (i.e., recency effects; Sullivan, 2018). For example, when
evaluating faces that display a series of expressions, trait impressions
are more strongly influenced by the expression that was displayed last
(Fang, van Kleef, & Sauter, 2018). In a similar vein, participants might
have attributed more importance to facial photographs because they
were the only new information that was displayed after they indicated
their preliminary verdicts. To participants, this may imply that this
information is relevant for their decisions (Clark & Haviland, 1977).
More research is needed to systematically explore how the order in
which facial appearance and other cues are processed affects the in-
fluence of facial stereotypes.
We do not doubt that certain manipulations could diminish or
eliminate the effect of facial trustworthiness on verdicts. For example,
providing unambiguous, outcome-relevant information has been shown
to reduce reliance on stereotypes (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Rezlescu
et al., 2012). However, such decisive information (e.g., clear evidence
that the defendant committed the crime) is often not available in real
life. In many situations, such as legal sentencing, personnel selection, or
voting, people have to make consequential decisions based on limited,
ambiguous, or contradicting information. We therefore focused on
4 This effect was significantly larger than the effect of facial trustworthiness
on initial verdicts in Study 2, where participants were not exposed to the face
images (648 participants in the sequential and sequential-and-reflection con-
ditions), β = 0.177, SE = 0.068, z = 2.60, p = .009, 95% CI [0.044, 0.310],
OR = 1.19.
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testing the effectiveness of different interventions in a decision-making
environment that resembles these conditions.
In the present studies, we always compared situations in which the
plaintiff was trustworthy-looking and the defendant was untrustworthy-
looking or vice versa. Thus, our data do now show whether sentencing
decisions are more strongly influenced by the perceived trustworthiness
of plaintiffs or defendants, or whether there are interaction effects be-
tween both parties' perceived trustworthiness (Zebrowitz & McDonald,
1991). Moreover, if sentencing decisions are driven by the difference in
perceived trustworthiness of the plaintiff and defendant, manipulating
both parties' perceived trustworthiness simultaneously would increase
its overall effect. This suggests that the effect of facial trustworthiness
on sentencing decisions may be smaller under different circumstances,
such as when a trustworthy-looking plaintiff is suing a slightly less
trustworthy-looking defendant.
Finally, it should be noted that some of our participants may have
been exposed to the face stimuli before, which were taken from a
publicly available face database (Ma et al., 2015). This could have re-
duced the effect of facial trustworthiness of sentencing decisions, as
previous work suggests that non-naïveté in participants leads to smaller
effect sizes (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, Mueller, & Ratliff, 2015; Rand &
Kraft-Todd, 2014). For example, one can imagine that participants who
were familiar with the faces paid less attention to them when making
sentencing decisions. However, our data do not suggest that a large
number of participants responded carelessly. Participants did not click
through the cases as fast as possible—the median response time for
verdicts was around 35 s—and only a fraction of participants (ca. 1%)
indicated the same verdict on all trials. We also excluded data from all
participants who failed an attention check at the end of the study.
Evidence for the biasing influence of trait impressions is well-
documented and researchers have called for attempts to curb this bias
(Olivola et al., 2014; Porter et al., 2010; Wilson & Rule, 2015). We took
a first step in this direction but, ultimately, we were unsuccessful in
reducing the influence of facial stereotypes. To stimulate further re-
search in this area, we have made all materials needed to implement the
legal sentencing task that was used here publicly available. This task
allows for within-subject manipulations of facial appearance (or of
other cues such as race or gender), which is statistically powerful and
provides an indicator of reliance on facial stereotypes at the participant
level. We hope that our results will motivate others to design and test
other kinds of interventions.
9. Conclusion
The present research replicates prior findings that legal sentencing
decisions are influenced by facial stereotypes. Participants consistently
found untrustworthy-looking defendants guilty more often than trust-
worthy-looking defendants. We also sought to curb this bias by edu-
cating people about how inaccurate their trait impressions are and by
disrupting the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions. Crucially, both
attempts did not succeed in reducing the effect of facial trustworthiness
on sentencing decisions. The present findings show that people persis-
tently rely on facial stereotypes when making decisions and that this
bias is difficult to mitigate.
Open practices
All data, materials, preregistrations, and analysis scripts are avail-
able at the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/h4yf3/).
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